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Abstract 
This report is meant to summarize the discussion themes introduced in the Fellows Day session of the 9th Biennial 
Congress of the International Academy of Intercultural Research held in Bergen, Norway June 28, 2015. The report also 
attempts to summarize some of the participant comments made during the session. Because it is a report and not an 
original research article, descriptions of concepts are intentionally truncated and referencing is restricted to establish-
ing context more than linking to other contemporary treatments of the issue. Further, the summary of participant 
comments is necessarily selective and may not reflect the complete intention of the commentator. Participant com-
ments were for the most part informed observations or statements of opinion and are therefore not accompanied by 
formal references. The Fellows Day session was advertised with the following description: Practitioners of intercultural 
communication and cross-cultural psychology routinely make the claim that cultural diversity is an asset to teams, 
organizations, and societies. The more research-oriented among us quote studies that have shown correlations of cre-
ativity and heterogeneity of teams, profitability and diversity in corporations, and innovativeness and immigration in 
societies. These studies serve our purposes, but to what extent are they indicative of a general value of diversity? What 
is the research that fails to show these correlations or that suggests complex mediating factors? How do we integrate 
our understanding of immigrant assimilation with the preservation of ethnic diversity? How can we extend the idea of 
preserving diversity to the realm of mergers and acquisitions in corporations? Is the global village generating homo-
geneity, or is it really, as McLuhan (Understanding media: the extensions of man. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964) put it, 
that our neighbors will be profoundly different from us? And is that intrinsically good, or do we need to make it good? 
These and other questions central to our social future are appropriate for consideration by IAIR Fellows. I propose that 
we do so in three exploratory phases: *The first exploration is of the rhetoric: what we want to believe, what we sell, 
and how we support that with anecdote and ideology. I am not using "rhetoric" in a pejorative way here; I mean it 
more like "narrative" or "value proposition" (which is, by the way, the way the term is used by academic rhetoricians). 
Thus, the idea is to explore the assumptions we are making in claiming that cultural diversity is a good thing. I hope 
part of this conversation will position our narrative in the largely post-enlightenment, post-modern Western context 
that is its home, and that is will also explore how the idea of diversity has or has not emerged in other geo/historical 
contexts. *The second exploration is a more critical view of our claims, seeking both supportive and contradictory 
theory and research regarding the value of diversity and/or the value of uniformity. I don’t mean to juxtapose "reality" 
in a positive way to "rhetoric." Rather, I mean to invoke the empirical reality of research as a tool to assess and either 
support or not our rhetorical claims. I hope we can include both quantitative and qualitative and both descriptive 
and nomothetic forms of research in our consideration, with the goal of seeing how our claims about the value of 
diversity stand up to systematic observation. * The third phase is reconciliatory, exploring ways to form a dialectic of 
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Background
This report is meant to summarize the discussion 
themes introduced in the Fellows Day session of the 
9th Biennial Congress of the International Academy 
of Intercultural Research held in Bergen, Norway June 
28, 2015. The report also attempts to summarize some 
of the participant comments made during the session. 
Because it is a report and not an original research arti-
cle, descriptions of concepts are intentionally truncated 
and referencing is restricted to establishing context 
more than linking to other contemporary treatments 
of the issue. Further, the summary of participant com-
ments is necessarily selective and may not reflect the 
complete intention of the commentator. Participant 
comments were for the most part informed observa-
tions or statements of opinion and are therefore not 
accompanied by formal references.
The Fellows Day session was advertised with the fol-
lowing description:
Practitioners of intercultural communication and 
cross-cultural psychology routinely make the claim 
that cultural diversity is an asset to teams, organi-
zations and societies. The more research-oriented 
among us quote studies that have shown correlations 
of creativity and heterogeneity of teams, profitability 
and diversity in corporations and innovativeness and 
immigration in societies. These studies serve our pur-
poses, but to what extent are they indicative of a gen-
eral value of diversity? What is the research that fails 
to show these correlations or that suggests complex 
mediating factors? How do we integrate our under-
standing of immigrant assimilation with the preserva-
tion of ethnic diversity? How can we extend the idea of 
preserving diversity to the realm of mergers and acqui-
sitions in corporations? Is the global village generat-
ing homogeneity, or is it really, as McLuhan (McLuhan 
1964) put it, that our neighbors will be profoundly dif-
ferent from us? And is that intrinsically good, or do we 
need to make it good?
These and other questions central to our social future 
are appropriate for consideration by IAIR Fellows. I pro-
pose that we do so in three exploratory phases:
  • The first exploration is of the rhetoric: what we want 
to believe, what we sell and how we support that with 
anecdote and ideology. I am not using “rhetoric” in a 
pejorative way here; I mean it more like “narrative” 
or “value proposition” (which is, by the way, the way 
the term is used by academic rhetoricians). Thus, the 
idea is to explore the assumptions we are making 
in claiming that cultural diversity is a good thing. I 
hope part of this conversation will position our nar-
rative in the largely post-enlightenment, post-mod-
ern Western context that is its home and that is will 
also explore how the idea of diversity has or has not 
emerged in other geo/historical contexts.
  • The second exploration is a more critical view of our 
claims, seeking both supportive and contradictory 
theory and research regarding the value of diversity 
and/or the value of uniformity. I do not mean to jux-
tapose “reality” in a positive way to “rhetoric.” Rather, 
I mean to invoke the empirical reality of research as a 
tool to assess and either support or not our rhetori-
cal claims. I hope we can include both quantitative 
and qualitative and both descriptive and nomothetic 
forms of research in our consideration, with the goal 
of seeing how our claims about the value of diversity 
stand up to systematic observation.
  • The third phase is reconciliatory, exploring ways to 
form a dialectic of diversity and unity that would pro-
vide us with a more sophisticated guide to practical 
action in the areas of education, corporate consulting 
and intercultural training. In my practical work as a 
trainer and organizational development consultant, I 
have observed that no matter how sterling the value 
of diversity might be, it needs to be reconciled with 
the frequently more highly valued need for “unity”—
shared goals, common procedures, universal policies, 
etc. Given our discussion of the day, how might we 
address both sides of this dialectic in practical, effec-
tive and acceptable ways? In other words, where can 
we go from here….
This report includes a summary of introduc-
tory remarks and a textual description of comments, 
diversity and unity that would provide us with a more sophisticated guide to practical action in the areas of educa-
tion, corporate consulting, and intercultural training. In my practical work as a trainer and organizational development 
consultant, I have observed that no matter how sterling the value of diversity might be, it needs to be reconciled with 
the frequently more highly valued need for "unity" — shared goals, common procedures, universal policies, etc. Given 
our discussion of the day, how might we address both sides of this dialectic in practical, effective, and acceptable 
ways? In other words, where can we go from here…
Keywords: Cultural diversity, Inclusion, Intercultural communication, Cross-cultural relations, Intercultural sensitivity, 
Ethicality
Page 3 of 14Bennett  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:897 
criticisms and responses on the topic. The author of this 
report, Milton Bennett, asserts that he has no conflict of 
interest related to the topic or the material contained in 
the report.
Phase I: The rhetoric of cultural diversity
By way of introducing the topic, this phase of the day will 
address three questions:
1. What is the paradigmatic basis of cultural relativity 
and what is the implication flowing from that para-
digm for the value of cultural diversity?
2. Is attributing value to cultural diversity a particu-
larly Western post-enlightenment, even post-modern 
phenomenon?
3. Are we experiencing a clash of paradigms, including 
profound disagreement about the value of cultural 
diversity driven by different paradigmatic world-
views?
At the end of the Phase I presentation, comments and 
responses are summarized before moving on to Phase II 
and III (which were combined in the actual session).
Presentation
I use the term “paradigm” in the sense defined by Kuhn 
(1967) as foundational epistemologies that change over 
time. I like the specific terminology popularized by Briggs 
and Peat (1984), where they distinguish three major para-
digms in physics: Newtonian, Einsteinian and Quantum. 
I have argued in my recent book (Bennett 2013) that the 
physics paradigms have crossed over into social science 
as positivism, relativism and constructivism, respectively. 
In the following remarks, I will suggest that our under-
standing of “diversity” is profoundly influenced by the 
paradigmatic context in which we are doing the under-
standing and further, that the very idea of “diversity” is 
dependent on both a post-enlightenment and a post-
modern paradigmatic perspective. That the idea of diver-
sity exists in a paradigmatic and cultural context does not 
make it weaker, but it does demand that we understand 
those contexts if we wish to argue for its value.
The concept of “science” itself exists in a paradigmatic 
and cultural context. As a secular, empirical endeavor, 
science is a result of the empirical investigation in West-
ern Europe that began in the mid-seventeenth century 
and culminated with the age of enlightenment in the 
18th century. Before we examine the idea of diversity in 
these modern European terms, it behooves us to consider 
pre-scientific or alter-enlightenment ways of understand-
ing diversity. By “pre-scientific” I do not mean to imply a 
teleological view of human development, where science 
would represent an inherently superior position. On the 
contrary, science simply offers alternative ways of under-
standing phenomena—ways that certainly are superior in 
guiding particular activities such as internet communi-
cation and space travel, but ways that are not necessar-
ily superior for all understanding. In fact, non-scientific 
ways of understanding continue to flourish in various 
human contexts. We need to comprehend these alter-
native ways of understanding, since they both represent 
challenges to scientific views of diversity and are them-
selves examples of diversity.
Pre-scientific paradigms are essentially religious—not 
in the sense of being religious systems, but in the sense 
of assuming supernatural causality. In these paradigms, 
explanations of why things happen are variations on God, 
gods, or other supernatural forces that cause the events 
human beings experience. Supernatural forces may oper-
ate capriciously, or they may operate according to some 
set of rules—albeit not empirically verifiable ones. The 
forces may be susceptible to influence, although special 
conditions such as the purity of the petitioner may apply 
to the success of such influence. In any case, the forces 
that control one’s fate or, indistinguishably, the fate of 
one’s group, are assumed to be unquestionably real. In 
contrast, people of other groups are not assumed to be 
as real. Pre-scientific paradigms are absolutist and they 
do not support the idea of “perspective.” Consequently, 
people experiencing the world through such paradigms 
cannot fathom the idea that other people might have dif-
ferent perspectives—that, in the classic words of Julian 
Jaynes (1976), they might be hearing the voices of differ-
ent gods. And if we lack a theory of mind for others, they 
cannot exist in equal human terms in our worldview; 
others can only be part of an unfamiliar and thus fear-
some place outside human reality.
Of course, non-European forms of intense scientific 
activity also exist and I have used the term “alter-enlight-
enment” to refer to their paradigmatic assumptions. 
Notable examples occurred in the medieval Islamic 
world and in the Chinese Han Dynasty. I will expand in 
a moment on the idea of enlightenment science as hav-
ing successfully reconciled separate secular and sacred 
domains. But in alter-enlightenment forms of science, the 
study of natural phenomena remains as a form of sacred 
worship, meditation, or correct action—it does not go 
down the path of secular reductionism that characterizes 
European empiricism. For instance, according to Joseph 
Needham (as reported by Winchester 2008), early Chi-
nese science was hampered by Buddhism and Taoism, 
both of which disavowed action in the empirical world 
and perhaps by a Confucian-driven bureaucracy that 
stressed the forming of human behavior more than the 
discovery of natural law. In Islamic science, a similar con-
flation of sacred and secular, of bureaucracy and behavior 
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may have restricted the development of pure empiri-
cism (Cf. Al Ghazalli 2002). In any case, while the alter-
enlightenment paradigms do allow a conceptualization of 
other people, they do not preclude the simultaneous view 
that one’s own group is “chosen” by God or some other 
divine force. Thus, by virtue of not being chosen, other 
people are inherently inferior. While sometimes the oth-
ers may be valuable, in the end they are expendable.
The implication of this discussion of non-enlighten-
ment based paradigms is that the value of diversity as 
Europeans commonly think of it simply does not exist 
in at least some other social and paradigmatic contexts. 
Those paradigms allow for the definition of otherness as 
“not us,” but they do not allow the idea that others have 
perspectives that are different but equally viable to our 
own. The post-modern concept of “alterity”—the con-
struction of identity as a perspective belonging to self in 
juxtaposition to other perspectives belonging to others—
does not make sense in these other paradigms. Conse-
quently, while others may be treated honorably and/or 
hospitably, they nevertheless are not intrinsically valuable 
because of their otherness. Particular others may have 
value as trading partners, or as sources of knowledge, but 
diversity in general is more likely to be seen as simply dis-
ruptive. If we are in the business of talking about diversity 
to people in non-European contexts—as many of us are—
we need to be conscious of our potentially differing para-
digms in regards to otherness, lest we (ironically) assume 
that everyone thinks like us.
The path to our current rhetoric about the value of 
diversity begins with the Newtonian paradigm and its 
translation into social science as positivism. After some 
nasty episodes between the ruling Church and earlier 
scientists, Galileo and subsequently Newton were suc-
cessful in arguing that the study of natural phenomena 
was, in fact, the study of God’s work (Chandrankunnel 
2011). They made the crucial case that God did not rule 
the universe directly (except perhaps in isolated miracu-
lous circumstances), but that the universe was the natural 
enactment of God’s law. Thus, we could seek to under-
stand the laws (e.g. of gravity) that determine cause and 
effect without unduly meditating on the will or whims 
of God(s). In cinematic terms, God became more like 
the executive producer than the director of the film and 
scientists could critique the film without incurring the 
wrath of the distant producer. Because post-enlighten-
ment science was secularized in a way that bypassed the 
theocratic controls of the time, it was relatively easy to 
turn the tools of science onto human behavior, as Comte 
(1966) did in Sociology. By understanding collective 
human behavior as if it were a natural event—that is, 
objectively—it was assumedly possible to discover the 
laws of such behavior and thus predict and control it. On 
the individual level, similar assumptions fueled behavior-
ism and sociobiology.
The Newtonian/positivist paradigm was not substan-
tially different than earlier pre-scientific paradigms in its 
absolutist assumptions; it was just that the absolute real-
ity changed from a more Platonic ideal or transcendent 
one to a more Aristotelian empirical one. There was still 
just one correct description of reality, one truth, which 
in this case is revealed by following the scientific method 
of investigation. Defined in these terms, a sort of social 
Darwinism allowed scientifically sophisticated groups 
to consider themselves as naturally more civilized than 
other groups who existed at lower levels of a “hierarchy of 
civilization” (Fig. 1). At the next level down were barbar-
ians who lacked civilization, but who could be brought 
into civilization through conversion, colonization, or 
nation building. Below them were savages who lacked 
complete human characteristics and who could therefore 
be enslaved or eliminated, if necessary. The Newtonian 
paradigm did not counteract these earlier historical ten-
dencies to treat outsiders in horrendous ways, but it set 
the stage for relativism, which did change the game.
The Einsteinian paradigm arguably represents the 
introduction of perspective into science. Einstein’s theory 
of special relativity demanded that the relative motion of 
observers necessarily affected their view of the universe. 
With this and other assumptions about the relativity of 
time and space, Einstein’s ideas challenged the prevailing 
assumption of a static universe that was wholly observa-
ble to anyone looking correctly in the same direction. The 
new Einsteinian universe was more dynamic and, while 
it still operated according to universal laws, it looked 
different depending on your observational context. This 
idea entered social science as “relativism.” The move was 
particularly evident in anthropology, where it supported 
Boas’ notion of cultural relativism as an alternative to the 
hierarchy of civilization (Fig. 1). Cultural relativism holds 
that every civilization exists in its own context and has its 
own worldview (thus the notion of “culture” rather than 
“civilization”). Because they exist in context, cultures 
cannot be rank-ordered in terms of any universal princi-
ple—they cannot be more or less civilized. It follows that 
converting people to one form of civilization (assimila-
tion) is not necessarily the best policy and certainly it is 
not justified to treat any group as less human.
So, the basic idea of diversity is founded on relativism. 
Cultures, groups, or even individuals are not inherently 
better or worse than one another—they are just dif-
ferent. They may be better adapted to certain environ-
ments (e.g. Aleut people are more likely to survive cold 
weather), but only because the group has developed par-
ticular skills, or, in some cases because certain physical 
characteristics have been selected for (e.g. European milk 
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digestion, Tibetan hemoglobin production). In the area of 
diversity and human relations in general, the shift from 
positivism to relativism is fairly complete in European 
and North American contexts. Among other indicators 
of the completed shift, there is now a general accept-
ance of subjectivity in journalism, with “balance” rather 
than objectivity the goal in reporting; “narrative” is now 
often stressed over the facts of a matter, so that success in 
marketing, political positioning, or even career advance-
ment is increasingly “who has the best story (branding)”; 
positions in policy arguments are attributed to “special 
interests,” including the special interest of any govern-
ment agency that might be involved; groups are assumed 
to be selecting data that support their positions and 
downplaying data that don’t. These and similar phenom-
ena indicate that perspective in context has become an 
acceptable and even preferable way of explaining social 
phenomena (Fig. 2).
While none of the aforementioned relativist posi-
tions would survive in a more positivist paradigm, their 
Fig. 1 Hierarchy of civilization/cultural relativism
Fig. 2 Positivism/relativism
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existence doesn’t mean that positivism has vanished. On 
the contrary, clashes between relativism and positivism 
or even pre-scientific paradigms are apparently becoming 
more virulent. Some of these clashes represent the rear-
guard action noted by Kuhn (1967). He argues that when 
paradigms approach the end of their effective lives, they 
begin to show cracks. People committed to the paradigm 
try to shore it up by stressing its successes and belittling 
alternatives. For instance, as the limits of Newtonian-
based allopathic medicine approached (e.g. regarding 
immunology), many health professionals berated 
non-allopathic methods while redoubling efforts to 
explain dysfunction through traditional causal relation-
ships. Even though the shift to more holistic, systemic 
approaches in medicine, particularly in immunology, is 
now fairly complete, some allopathic physicians continue 
to denounce any alternative medicine as quackery. Simi-
larly, relativism continues to be attacked by positivists 
who correctly see it as threatening to more absolutist or 
universalist explanations of human behavior. In addition, 
relativism is attacked by supporters of pre-scientific par-
adigms—mostly fundamentalist religious and extremely 
conservative political believers. Cases of both domestic 
and international terrorism can be attributed to this par-
adigm clash (Bennett 2016).
I believe that relativism is now showing cracks, por-
tending its end as a prevailing paradigm in social rela-
tions. Following Kuhn’s observation about the likely 
rear-guard action, supporters of relativism are exaggerat-
ing the benefits of the paradigm in ways that are referred 
to pejoratively as “political correctness.” Typically, in this 
pejorative sense, political correctness is accompanied 
by the “PC Police” who foster a climate of fear regard-
ing difference. For instance, I recently consulted with a 
university that has a website devoted to instructing stu-
dents how to demand that people use the “correct” set 
of non-gender specific pronouns with them. (FYI, three 
such sets were presented, in addition to the traditional 
“his” and/or “her.”) As the idea of contextualized perspec-
tive is extended in many European and North American 
societies, it is losing its focus on culture and becoming 
individualized; cultural relativism is giving way to indi-
vidual relativism. Predictably, individuals are demanding 
that they can only be understood in their own idiosyn-
cratic terms and that any failure to do so—to treat them 
as members of a group, or to evaluate them in terms of 
a normative standard—constitutes disrespect. The move 
to individual relativism obviates the very idea of culture 
and thus the notion that cultural variation can be valu-
able. Ironically, individual perspective is being rigidified 
into an absolute position.
As the relativist paradigm deteriorates, the value 
of diversity is unlikely to be realized through its 
assumptions. As originally construed in relativism, the 
value of cultural diversity would derive from variations 
in how groups adapt to their environments. For instance, 
if my group is adapted to fast problem-solving and your 
group is adapted to reflective analysis and assuming that 
as individuals we can enact this group pattern, then our 
working together on a project has obvious added value. 
However, the advantages of diversity do not occur auto-
matically and diversity in and of itself can be a severely 
disruptive force in organizations and societies. One way 
this disruption can occur is when relativism is taken to 
the extreme of political correctness, as mentioned above. 
In a climate of fear regarding difference, people are reluc-
tant to discuss different culture-based skills for fear of 
stereotyping either themselves or others. Since cultural 
differences do not go away just because they are not dis-
cussed (cf. Hofstede 1984), they become impediments 
to effective coordination. In such a politically charged 
environment, differences may also become associated 
with “identity politics,” fueling unhealthy competition for 
resources in both organizations and larger societies.
The impending paradigm is based on the now prevail-
ing philosophy of Quantum mechanics in physics, which 
takes the form of “constructivism” in social science. 
While not yet well-established in social science disci-
plines (many of which are still trying to establish credibil-
ity in positivist terms or struggling to meet the excessive 
demands of relativism), constructivism offers some clear 
advantages in construing the value of cultural diversity. 
Added to the relativist notion that facts exist in context, 
constructivism demands that the observer of data take 
responsibility for the construction of the context that 
discriminates the data in the first place. For instance, a 
relativist view of IQ is that the indicators of intelligence 
are likely to vary by cultural (and other) context and so 
one can not use IQ as a universal standard. The construc-
tivist view of IQ is that it is the result of our inferring a 
cause for certain consistencies we have attributed impor-
tance to in how people respond to various measures we 
have constructed (Gould 2012). The assumption that we 
are responsible for constructing a version of reality does 
not thereby make the construction less valuable. For 
instance, IQ could continue to be a useful tool in pre-
dicting performance in some situations. But we would be 
more attentive to which situations were appropriate to its 
use—not just in the relativist sense of “unbiased,” but in 
the constructivist sense of “consistent with our purposes.” 
To continue with Gould’s argument, if the original pur-
pose of defining “intelligence” was to guide educational 
intervention, does rank-ordering people in terms of IQ 
continue to serve that purpose? It is constructivist to take 
responsibility for asking this question and for creating 
the context in which an answer is given.
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Other indicators of the shift from a more relativist to 
a more constructivist paradigm are (1) the shift from 
assuming that facts exist in context to recognizing our 
role in creating those contexts; (2) the recognition that 
differing narratives are not different versions of truth, but 
more like different versions of reality; (3) and that there-
fore argument is neither about the truth of a matter or 
about whose version of truth will prevail, but it is about 
what version of reality we wish to live in (Fig.  3). The 
implication of this paradigm shift for valuing diversity is 
that our focus is shifting from listing cultural differences 
(as if those differences were intrinsically valuable) to 
determining ways that differing experiences of reality can 
be coordinated towards some agreed upon goal.
To think in these more processual terms, we need 
to begin with a non-reified definition of culture such 
as “the coordination of meaning and action among a 
group of people defined by a boundary” (Fig.  4). This 
constructivist definition is similar to some of the ideas 
of “culture” used by E.T. Hall and Gregory Bateson in 
their original definition of intercultural communica-
tion. In this definition, “culture” is not a thing, but 
rather an action we undertake. The action of coordina-
tion implies purposefulness—moving towards some 
more or less agreed upon goal. The coordination occurs 
within a constructed boundary, so that, for instance, 
Europeans could be coordinating themselves within the 
European Union boundary towards the goal of main-
taining peaceful international relations, while they are 
simultaneously coordinating themselves within national 
boundaries for the purpose of maintaining economic 
well-being and distinct national identity, while they are 
simultaneously coordinating themselves in provincial 
units for the purpose of maintaining social services, 
while they are simultaneously coordinating themselves 
in professional groups for the purpose of maintaining 
professional standards, etc. Importantly, these bound-
ary conditions need to co-exist as constructs. If we shift 
to thinking of them as systemic terms—super-systems 
and sub-systems—we are shifting back into a relativist 
paradigm where contexts have an a priori existence. In 
the more constructivist view, systems only exist inso-
far as we maintain the definitional boundary—a kind of 
social application of the Quantum principle of “observer 
dependence.”
Following this definition of culture, a constructivist 
definition of intercultural communication is “the coor-
dination of meaning and action across coordinating 
systems”—a “meta-coordination” (Fig. 5). Why would we 
want to do that? On a tactical level, meta-coordination 
is necessary on multicultural teams and in multicultural 
organizations or societies to get people moving in more 
or less the same direction without eliminating the cul-
tural differences. In other words, it is the alternative to 
assimilation. Assuming that assimilation is not that effec-
tive even when it’s sincerely attempted, this is a way of 
acknowledging the ongoing influence of differing sociali-
zation in a way that is both respectful and also effective. 
But more importantly, meta-coordination (what I call 
“adaptation” in the Developmental Model of Intercultural 
Fig. 3 Relativism/constructivism
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Sensitivity) is the key to deriving value from diver-
sity. Obviously, if we seek to eliminate cultural diversity 
through assimilation, we are not supporting the poten-
tial value of that diversity. So we need to maintain cul-
tural differences, both in a way in which the differences 
can be coordinated towards some end and also in a way 
in which the differences can synergize to generate value. 
For instance, returning to the example of culture-based 
preferences for problem-solving or reflection and assum-
ing (as we have been) that the differences (1) will not go 
away in an assimilative context and (2) will not automati-
cally be used towards a mutually desirable goal, the need 
is to intentionally coordinate the differences towards a 
goal. In most cases, this assumes that the people involved 
have a modicum of cultural self-awareness and that they 
can either themselves shift to a meta level to coordinate 
Fig. 4 Dialectic of culture
Fig. 5 Intercultural meta-level
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their differences or that a skilled facilitator (mediator, 
coach, trainer, group leader, etc.) can supply the meta-
level in interaction with them.
Discussion (A textual compilation of Phase I participant 
comments)
Criticism
The idea of “culture” itself may be a predominantly West-
ern notion. This would indeed be the case if culture was 
a construct enabled by the relativist paradigm and if rela-
tivism was a particularly Western notion. In support of 
that view, the pre-scientific or alter-enlightenment para-
digms that pervade non-Western societies do not neces-
sarily behave as described by Kuhn, either in the sense 
of scientific revolution nor in the sequence suggested in 
the introduction. Those paradigms are for the most part 
absolutist (truth-based) and/or universalist (all encom-
passing). So, while the notion of “context” might exist (as 
it does, apparently, in Japanese and probably other Asian 
cultures), the idea is defined in perspectival rather than 
assumptive terms. Kurasawa’s Rashoman may be repre-
sentative of perspectival view of context. Shifting per-
spective does not necessarily yield an appreciation of the 
assumptive worldview differences assumed in cultural 
relativism. And indeed, Japanese and other Asians with 
an assumedly more developed sense of context do not 
seem to be systematically less ethnocentric. So there is a 
good case to be made that “culture” as we currently think 
about it in Western contexts is uniquely due to the shift 
from Newtonian to Einsteinian paradigms and its mani-
festation in social science as relativism.
Response
The possible fact that culture is a predominantly West-
ern notion does not make it useless, even in applica-
tion to non-Western contexts. Apparently our history 
is filled with examples of diffusion and appropriation 
of ideas from one culture to another. Why not the idea 
of “culture” itself? Maybe it’s as useful a concept as the 
Buddhist system of mindfulness, the Chinese theory of 
energy meridians, or Mesopotamian idea of writing. In 
a constructivist paradigm rendering, constructs can be 
evaluated for their usefulness to a purpose rather than 
their nativity to a particular social context. We should 
resist being forced by the PC police into an extreme rela-
tivism position where no idea can be applied across cul-
tural contexts, including, as ironically they do, the idea of 
“culture.”
Criticism
The idea of “culture” may be the product of the false 
dichotomy of individualism and collectivism. Once that 
duality is established, there needs to be something that 
allows individuals to act in groups and we (Westerners) 
created “culture” for that purpose. So the reason culture 
has not originated as a concept amongst some other 
social groups is not that they lack the paradigm of relativ-
ism, but rather that they lack the dichotomy of individu-
alism and collectivism. Further, we dichotomize groups 
in terms of their being more individualistic or collectivist, 
when in fact we all are both.
Response
The observation that individualism/collectivism is a 
constructed idea is assumed in a constructivist para-
digm, whether it is treated as a dichotomy or as a con-
tinuum. And in that paradigm, the important question is, 
“Is it useful to make the distinction?” Certainly Triandis 
and others have shown that it is a useful concept in our 
understanding of how people organize their experience 
in the world differently. So perhaps the criticism should 
be about reifying the concept; that is, treating people as if 
they really were individualistic or collectivist. Reification 
leads us down the path of classifying people in ways that 
simplify (stereotype) them and in terms that the people 
themselves may reject. Instead, we can take responsibility 
for our observational distinction and use it to understand 
differences in the coordination of meaning and action, 
not to label people or cultures as this or that.
Criticism
The idea of “culture” may neglect power. Critical theory 
generally suggests that human interaction is a power play 
of domination and oppression. People who dominate (the 
dominant group) make the rules and impose them on 
others, who are typically oppressed by them. The obser-
vational categories of racism, sexism and other “isms” 
previously or yet to be defined refer to this process, both 
in individual and institutional terms. This critical focus 
on power is a robust line of theory and research in inter-
cultural relations (notably Martin and Nakayama 2012).
Response
The observation of this power dynamic is not a silly 
exercise of political correctness; in fact, people really do 
thrive on privilege and they really do suffer and die pre-
maturely from oppression. One could even argue that 
cultures in general are in an existential competition with 
one another for dominance in defining reality. But that 
doesn’t mean that people can not also be observed in 
relatively power-neutral worldview terms; a separation 
of ethnographic from normative. In a constructivist para-
digm, the observations we make are chosen through the 
contexts we create. When we create the context of rela-
tive power, it allows us to observe interactions in terms of 
dominance and oppression. When we create the context 
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of worldview differences, it allows us to observe interac-
tions in terms of collectivism/individualism and other 
constructed etic categories. Is one way of observing cor-
rect and the other not? Put this way, we probably would 
agree that both ways of observation are useful and even 
crucial to our mutual survival. If we don’t understand 
power, we fail to appreciate the experience of privilege 
and disadvantage. And if we don’t understand culture, we 
fail to appreciate alternative ways of being human. One 
could even argue that the each way of observing is nec-
essary for the other (Cf. Mendoza 2005; Alexander et al. 
2014).
Phase II and III: Deriving the Value of Cultural 
Diversity
The second and third phases ended up combined. There 
was not much new research reported specifically on the 
value of diversity and the discussion went more directly 
to implementation and the obstacles to implementation 
of valuing diversity efforts. The questions addressed were:
1. What are some examples of attempts to affirm the 
value of cultural diversity with empirical evidence?
2. How might an intercultural/cross-cultural approach 
to diversity address some of the issues of racism cur-
rently evident in the US and EU?
3. What are other ways that we might make our work 
more efficacious in the current global environment?
After the Phase II/III presentation, a final textual sum-
mary of comments is included.
Presentation
A compilation of research on work teams reported by 
Nancy Adler (2001) shows that multicultural teams are 
either more or less effective in completing a creative task, 
compared to monocultural teams. This is an important 
finding, since people do complain that cultural diversity 
does not add value—it’s just a lot of trouble. According to 
the team research, they’re right, at least part of the time. 
When they are wrong, when diversity clearly adds value 
to team performance, the determining factor is leader-
ship. If the leader of a multicultural group acknowledges 
cultural difference and takes the time to establish it as 
asset, the team outperforms the monocultural team. But 
if the leader suppresses cultural difference, usually in 
the name of the overriding corporate culture, the differ-
ences don’t go away—they just become impediments to 
performance.
In general, leadership appears to be the key to deriv-
ing the value of diversity. The Harvard Business School 
professor Rosabeth Moss Kantor (Moss Kanter 1995) has 
argued that, in the 21st century, all global organizations 
will have access to cultural diversity; but the companies 
that will thrive in that environment are those who can 
turn access into an asset. And this, she suggests, is largely 
a leadership issue. That idea is supported by the ongoing 
HBC Leadership Initiative, where over 1300 entrepre-
neurial leaders showed a common pattern of being par-
ticularly attentive to their own context and able to shift 
into different contexts (Mayo and Nitin 2005). In other 
words, the leaders assessed in the HBC research appear 
to be able to create a meta-level on cultural context—a 
core intercultural communication skill. And it has cer-
tainly been my experience as an organizational consult-
ant over several decades that successful diversity efforts 
must start and be maintained by strong leadership.
The impediments to implementing efforts to derive 
value from diversity are legion. The main impediment 
and the one that probably receives the least attention, is 
the way that we define “culture” and “cultural diversity” in 
the first place. Positivist and other absolutist approaches 
to these definitions inevitably yield ethnocentrism, 
because the very idea of culture cannot exist in those par-
adigms. Cultural diversity may be treated as non-exist-
ent or irrelevant (Denial in the Developmental Model of 
Intercultural Sensitivity), or differences may be treated as 
existential threats—Defense in the DMIS.
In the subtlest form of ethnocentrism—Minimiza-
tion—cultural differences are seen as surface variations 
on universal human attributes or values (Fig. 6). The dis-
covery of common humanity is often taken as the “cure” 
for racism, sexism and other manifestations of Defense. 
But, ironically, it is just shifts the form of ethnocentrism 
from overt polarized judgment to covert assumptions 
about universality of one’s own experience in the world. 
In terms commonly used in diversity work, Minimiza-
tion changes racism, sexism and other isms into privilege. 
Even the Acceptance of cultural difference may not sup-
port effective programs, since Acceptance can be associ-
ated with the extreme relativism of political correctness 
and thus create more of a climate of fear than a climate 
of respect for cultural diversity. In DMIS terms, the 
developmental position most likely to support valuing 
diversity efforts is Adaptation. That position is located 
in a more constructivist paradigm, where the viability 
of alternative ways of being are acknowledged and con-
sciousness is available to create meta-levels on cultural 
contexts. Even then, the efforts may fade away unless 
they finally emerge from Integration, which is the posi-
tion where previously conscious efforts at valuing diver-
sity become unconscious—that is, they become habitual 
for individuals and institutionalized in organizations.
Another major impediment to implementing diversity 
work is the issue of ethicality. In any of the pre-scientific 
paradigms, ethicality is straightforward. God(s) or their 
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messengers tell you what is right and you either do that 
or you don’t and suffer the consequences. Sometimes 
the alter-enlightenment paradigms (e.g. Islamic science) 
work similarly, or sometimes they incorporate a more 
complex set of guiding principles (e.g. Chinese Bud-
dhism). In post-enlightenment societies, ethicality can 
also be a straightforward matter: a positivist paradigm 
encourages absolute ethical positions based on authority, 
although not necessarily a supernatural authority. Obvi-
ously, these ethical positions are consistent with ethno-
centrism—I know what is right and it’s right for you, too 
(since we all live the same absolute reality).
Ethical ambiguity begins with the acceptance of cul-
tural difference. If we really believe that people can expe-
rience the world in different ways that are “not bad or 
good, just different,” and if part of people’s unique experi-
ence is in terms of a particular set of values, then it would 
be consistent to accept all viable value systems as being 
equally good. But we do not and we should not. Unfor-
tunately, the alternative generally is to return to ethno-
centrism (at least the Minimization form) and claim 
that despite superficial differences in cultural beliefs and 
behavior, there really are underlying universal values that 
apply to all people. It doesn’t matter if the underlying 
values are “sensitive” ones such as human rights, gender 
equality, empathy, or “realistic” ones such as social privi-
lege, male dominance and self-interest. It is the assump-
tion of universality that makes them ethnocentric.
In paradigmatic terms, the problem is relativism. Cul-
tural relativisim generates the idea of cultural context, 
but it does so with the continuing Einsteinian assumption 
that a universal underlying reality exists despite our sin-
cerely different perceptions and experiences of it. As long 
as there is no contact or conflict among cultural contexts, 
the superficial assumption of relativity can hold. But 
in the case of conflict and the necessity of taking some 
action for or against a position, superficial cultural rela-
tivism generates paralysis. Any action is disrespectful of 
cultural difference, one way or the other. And since no 
action is itself an action in conflictual situations, things 
may devolve into allegations of insensitivity on all sides. 
The alternative to paralysis, without changing paradigms, 
is to invoke the assumed underlying reality and thus, to 
return to ethnocentrism.
Changing paradigms opens up other possibilities of 
dealing with ethical conflict respectfully. One such con-
structivist model of ethicality was posited by William 
Perry (1970) and has been modernized by Lee Knefel-
kamp (1998). Their model addresses exactly the ethi-
cal problem of relativism (Fig.  7). In the developmental 
Fig. 6 Paradigms of intercultural sensitivity
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scheme, Dualism is the default condition of absolute 
right and wrong given by some authority. That position 
may give way to Multiplicity, where the truth is occluded 
by bias and limited perspective. But both of those posi-
tions are “seeking truth” in the sense that there is an 
underlying (or transcendent) reality that could guide 
ethical decisions. In paradigmatic terms, the movement 
from Dualism to Multiplicity is from positivism to rela-
tivism. And similarly, in both paradigms the demand for 
action is a matter of seeking truth.
The alternative to this default method of ethical judg-
ment is contextual relativism. That developmental posi-
tion demands that we take the perspective of others; 
it calls for empathically participating in others’ reality, 
including taking their ethical position on the conflict-
ual issue. In paradigmatic terms, contextual relativism 
is based in constructivism, in that it assumes that alter-
native viable realities exist and that we can empathically 
have access to them. Then, only after having experienced 
our opponents’ world, can we formulate an ethnorela-
tive action—Commitment in relativism. Such an action 
may look the same as one taken from an ethnocentric 
position, but it is not; it is respectful of the full human-
ity of others, including their differing viable values. The 
world could be the other way, but we can choose that it 
should not be. So, even if we were to decide to violently 
stop another person or group from doing something, 
assuming that we had empathically engaged them first, 
we would be doing so from a considered choice rather 
than an immutable conviction. This exercise of ethical 
consciousness is enabled by a constructivist epistemol-
ogy and necessary for maintaining a climate of respect 
for diversity.
Discussion (A textual compilation of Phase II/III participant 
comments)
Criticism
We are living in a perilous time of culture clashes and 
may be moving backwards in terms of our appreciation 
of cultural diversity. Massive migration and asylum-
seeking in Europe, the Middle East and Africa are over-
whelming social services and fueling fascist reaction. 
Hate crimes are on the increase, both as manifestations 
of personal bigotry and as forms of domestic terrorism. 
Inequity is increasing and is exalted by those who are 
benefiting from it. Women face not only the glass ceil-
ing, but the “glass cliff.” Worse, violence against women 
continues to exist and is openly justified in political and 
religious terms by many. Successful efforts at building 
multicultural societies, e.g. Canada and Germany, are 
Fig. 7 The Perry ethical scheme
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under fire for their very success—creating a relatively 
safe environment for diversity. More than just a clash of 
cultural norms, we are facing an existential competition 
for the very definition of social reality. (Author’s note: a 
reviewer of this report disputes the accuracy of this state-
ment about Canada and Germany.)
Response
There are several things we should be doing to counter-
act the conditions of existential culture clash. One is to 
implement the well-known Allport/Pettigrew condition 
for beneficial cross-cultural contact: equal power. As long 
as inequity exists at the level it does now, exacerbated by 
economic greed, sexism and xenophobia, cross-cultural 
contact will yield increased stereotyping and reduced tol-
erance. At least we should emphasize programs such as 
student and worker exchange that tend to meet the con-
ditions and actually decrease prejudice.
In terms of the “clash of civilizations” sometimes attrib-
uted to current relations between some Islamic groups and 
others, we should remember that the Crusades are over. 
One of the most important aspects of the enlightenment 
in Europe was the reconciliation of sacred and secular that 
allowed science to flourish without destroying religious 
belief. While other cultures and religions will not and 
should not duplicate European history in this regard, we all 
need to consider how religious and secular experience can 
co-exist in our societies. The history of theocracies (like 
that of dictatorships, or absolute monarchies) does not 
speak well of their fitness to an equitable global environ-
ment. It is unlikely that the “end of history” is democracy, 
or market-driven capitalist systems, managed economies, 
or any other governing system currently practiced. But it 
is clear that whatever system we create is one that must 
accommodate people who are experiencing reality differ-
ently and one that can derive value from that fact.
Criticism
It may be that the “melting pot” is not as dead as we 
thought. At least the idea of assimilation seems to be lin-
gering in societies as a vaguely defined goal for accultur-
ating migrant and refugee populations.
Response
To counter this discredited ideal, we need to be making 
a better case for bilingualism and biculturality. The neu-
rological evidence is building for the benefits of these 
conditions and we need to make the argument that the 
extension of those benefits can accrue to multicultural 
societies. The deeper issue is how to reconcile unity and 
diversity. Too often, these positions are juxtaposed, when 
if fact every organization and society needs both unity 
to generate focus and diversity to generate innovation. 
Our work in intercultural and cross-cultural training or 
education needs to stress this kind of deep development, 
rather than dwelling on superficial cultural differences 
that do not really make a difference to whether we can 
live together in diversity.
Conclusion
In sum, the presentation and discussion of the Fel-
lows day suggested at least the following conditions in 
approaching the value of cultural diversity.
1. A relativist understanding of cultural context that is 
clearly differentiated from positivism.
2. An avoidance of the political correctness extremes 
of relativism, while preserving the idea that cul-
tural groupings and identities are inherently 
respectable.
3. A reconciliation of critical and descriptive worldview 
approaches to diversity, so that we can talk about 
power/oppression and worldview differences in a 
separate but complementary way.
4. An understanding of the role of leadership in estab-
lishing a climate of respect for cultural diversity.
5. A constructivist understanding of “cultural experi-
ence” and “intercultural relations” that allows us to 
empathize deeply with others while preserving our 
own identities and ethical commitments.
6. A recognition of the developmental aspect of inter-
cultural sensitivity and ethicality, so that we can 
approach living together in multicultural societies 
and the gobal village as an ongoing adaptation to the 
social environment we are creating.
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